Quick Take: How the US Created the European Union

The US needed a system to herd its European vassals together, so DC created one

(This post is a quasi follow-up to an earlier post about everything that is wrong with the European Union.)

Among the many lies told about the European Union, official histories of the European integration process deserve a place of pride.

These histories, uniformly, tell you an entirely fictitious story of how a group of peaceful, well-meaning, Christian, white, middle-aged guys came together after World War II to end decades of wars and put a continent on the road towards economic integration and political union, through selfless acts such as creating such and such organization and attending such and such meeting and giving such and such speech. No wonder there’s been no Netflix miniseries made out of that.

When these histories cite the name of Richard Nikolaus Eijiro, Count of Coudenhove-Kalergi (November 16, 1894 – July 27, 1972), they NEVER give you any background about this curious character, a Netflix-friendly Austrian-Japanese politician and aristocrat: the main driver for European integration, he served for 49 years as the founding president of the Paneuropean Union, the first group of people to propose European unity with any degree of seriousness. He came up with the EU’s anthem and symbols, and urged the adoption of a single currency and most of the EU’s main policy lines.

This very strange man, a great admirer of Trotsky and the Soviet Union, received the first Charlemagne Prize (the top EU prize, also won by Bill Clinton, Tony Blair and Henry Kissinger) in 1950. But he also was a racist crank, probably killed himself and was one of the weirdest people to ever live. So he’s best not mentioned in polite company and will never make Netflix.

Another thing that is never mentioned in polite company is that the EU itself is an American creation, as it is the post-war drive towards European political integration and the process that finally led to the rise of the Union itself, all of which were pushed by the US since the beginning.

The United States of Europe was, from day one, an American project to control its European satellites more efficiently. This is an important fact to bear in mind a time when European leaders are trying to leverage whatever power the EU has against the current president of their American hegemon; and one that points to the low likelihood of success for such an attempt.

The creation, in the spring of 1950, of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), the first successful supranational organization in European history, reflected several important American priorities: the need to reintroduce Germany into Europe with constraints on its independence action; Britain's hostility to surrendering even one iota of its sovereignty as it clung to the myth of a special relationship with the United States and the sterling area; France's need to compensate for its inglorious conduct in 1940 and for its minor role in the victory over Germany; and, most importantly, American determination to create a united Europe strong enough to defend itself yet not so strong as to threaten American hegemony¹.

American support for European integration — in the pre-war era a crazy notion defended only by Coudenhove and fellow cranks and idlers — was virtually unanimous after the war. In January, 1947, John Foster Dulles delivered an address in New York in which he called for the reconstruction of Europe along federal lines and for the connection to it of a decentralized German confederation, both under American leadership. This was immediately described by Walter Lippmann as a "a turning point in United States foreign policy" and one that was supported by the Republican Party as well as by then-ruling Democrats.

For American policymakers, a united Europe was the ultimate solution to the German problem, first and foremost, a point explicitly made by the likes of Nicholas Murray Butler, president of Columbia University, and William H. Chamberlin, political columnist, who wrote that unification was "Europe's only and last chance for recovery." Edgar Ansel Mowrer, a well-known commentator, described a unified Europe as the "sovereign instrument in the containment of the Soviet Union," while Lippmann believed that only European union could prevent the spread of chaos in that area.

Similarly, seventy-two prominent Americans issued "an appeal to citizens of the U.S. of A." to support a United States of Europe. They warned that only a union inspired by American ideals of federalism and democracy could save Europe from falling into a state of anarchy. The American press was also unanimous in expressing support, as was Congress: Senators J. William Fulbright of Arkansas and Elbert Thomas of Utah fashioned a resolution on the subject, that they presented to the Senate on March 21, 1947. Senate Resolution # 10 stated "that the congress favors the creation of a United States of Europe within the framework of the United Nations.” The same resolution, with the number 34, was introduced in the House, and both passed overwhelmingly.

Fulbright, who became the leading voice on the issue in the senate, wrote to Coudenhove to coordinate efforts, which (as far as the US administration was concerned) effectively amounted to pushing on an open door: Secretary of State George C. Marshall did not conceal his "deep sympathy" with the resolution or his preference for a united Europe.

Indeed, the language of the Marshall Plan to fund the reconstruction of Europe with US aid revealed most emphatically the American position, to the point that the New York Times headlined news of its announcement as "Marshall pleads for European unity.” In Cleveland, Mississippi, on 8 May 1947, Secretary of State Dean Acheson put the case best in a speech:

"Europe's recovery cannot be complete until the various parts of Europe's economy are working together in a harmonious whole. And the achievement of a coordinated European economy remains a fundamental objective of our foreign policy.”

Even as Congress debated the legislation to implement the Marshall Plan, there was no question that the necessary funds would be appropriated. The discussion focused on the extent to which the United States should, in the legislation, insist on European unification as the price for aid. Witnesses at the hearings before the appropriate House and Senate committees unanimously agreed that one of the major objectives of the pending aid bill was the creation of a European union and that the United States should actively encourage its formation.

Several congressmen argued for such objectives to be made preconditions to receive aid, but they were outvoted, on the grounds that an overbearing American attitude could be counterproductive². It was much better, the soft-liners argued, that the US was seen as a generous, benevolent hegemon and that the Western Europeans were discreetly nudged to arrive in the desired destination by their own (apparent) volition³.

The US was so successful with this approach that at first it ensured the cooperation of the UK, the most powerful – and thus less inclined to share power – of the Western European countries. On January 21, 1948, UK Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin made the proposal public in a speech in the House of Commons: "The free nations of western Europe must now draw closer together. I believe the time is ripe for a consolidation of western Europe.”

With this move, enthusiastically praised by the US, the UK sought to drive integration on its own terms, on the basis of the Treaty of Alliance with France signed at Dunkirk March 4, 1947. The plan was to involve the Benelux nations first and then gradually add other European states. However, a hitch was evident early on, since the UK was against involving Germany: for the Americans, the most important nation among those seen in need of integration.

The British moved forward with their plan, and signed a treaty with their priority partners on March 17, 1948, that they grandiosely dubbed Western Union⁴. The US was supportive but somewhat disappointed since, in addition to eschewing Germany, the treaty was mostly a defense pact with little other content. France would have been content with economic access to British markets, but the UK – then dependent on non-European, often Commonwealth partners for 75% of its trade – wouldn’t play ball.

These frustrations contributed to the creation of the 16-country Organization of European Economic Cooperation, established in April 1948 with US blessing to coordinate the distribution of Marshall Plan aid. This organization later provided a framework for the negotiations that drove the creation of a European free trade area.

The OEEC had bigger aspirations than the Western Union, being presented as the embryo out of which might develop a United States of Europe, as the New York Times wrote⁵. The Americans, however, were again left disappointed: the organization, indeed, only agreed on the establishment of a customs union because this was believed to be the minimum unified effort acceptable by the US; it was only later, after it was left purposeless by the move towards integration launched by various countries, that it evolved into the non-specifically European Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) from 1961.

Various public conferences were held with American money and support to sell the idea of European integration to the masses. A congress in The Hague, over the summer of 1948, endeavored to write a constitution for a united, federated Europe. The biggest hurdle these efforts faced was, again, the absence of Germany.

The French Jean Monnet, a Gaullist who had been an advisor to Roosevelt and spent much of the war in Washington DC, was fastest to read the tea leaves; working with French foreign minister and ex-PM Robert Schuman – the Luxembourg-born and -raised son of a German citizen who spoke the local German dialect as his mother tongue – he established a direct line of communication with the German authorities under Allied supervision and their leader, the venerable anti-Nazi conservative Konrad Adenauer (1876-1967) installed by the Americans as mayor of Cologne fresh out of a Nazi prison.

Adenauer was the perfect person to work with the French to further American interests. Dismissed by the British occupation forces as soon as they could, because of his allegedly uncooperative attitude, Adenauer was disinclined to join the Brits in any initiatives even if they were to invite him, which they didn’t. As chairman of the heavily supervised convention that crafted the West German constitution, he was the natural pick for Chancellor of that country, born of the unification of the French, British and American zones of occupation when it was allowed to, on May 23, 1949.

Adenauer was enthusiastic about joining NATO, the new alliance bringing together the Western countries under American protection, and under the terms finetuned with the Soviets in Yalta. This contrasted with the stance of Social-Democrat leader Kurt Schumacher, who preferred to work (with the Soviets) for a unified and neutral Germany – an absolute no-no as far as the American hegemon was concerned.

The Americans weren’t happy that, as Monnet, Schuman and Adenauer moved forward with their integration plans, the British lagged behind. Paul Hoffman, in charge of implementing the Marshall Plan as head of the Economic Cooperation Administration between 1948 and 1950, expressed his distress – privately shared by the State Department – about British disinterest to work with the continent, explaining that without Britain there would be at best an imperfect European union and, at worst, no union at all. This, for those who were puzzled about American hostility to Brexit in the late 2010s, should explain quite a lot.

Various American officials, including Senator Fulbright, joined the chorus but the still Imperial government of her Majesty declined to listen.

When the European Parliamentary Union – a private organization set up by Coudenhove in 1947 – held its second congress in September 1948 and voted a resolution for greater European integration, the Americans were sympathetic but the British were aghast, citing the inclusion of Greece and Turkey in the parliamentary union as a sign of overreach.

Impervious, prominent members of Coudenhove’s coterie, including the former interwar French PM Leon Blum, worked throughout the winter and spring of 1948-1949 to craft what they (again) described as a constitution for a united Europe. From this emerged the statute for what came to be known as the Council of Europe, including the likes of Italy and Ireland but not Britain. The Americans were supportive but still disappointed, with Fulbright publicly expressing a degree of dismay about the slow pace of planned integration.

Efforts were made in Congress to tie American aid to progress on integration, but the State Department objected to what it saw as blatant blackmail. In the end, the extension of the European Aid Bill of 1949 stated that:

“it is further declared to be the policy of the United States to encourage the unification of Europe.”

A few months later, Hoffman told the OEEC Council that he expected visible results on economic integration as early as the next year.

The most promising track towards this goal remained alive and kicking, however. By early 1950, Monnet and Schuman crafted, with Adenauer’s acquiescence, what was dubbed the “Schuman Declaration,” a proposal to place French and West German coal and steel production under a single authority – a move so revolutionary and impactful, leading the next year to the creation of the ECSC, the seed of the European Union, that the date the Declaration was announced became “Europe Day,” an official, annual celebration of European integration.

The British immediately rejected any possibility of joining Schuman’s scheme, while the Americans expressed delight at its very existence. President Truman called it “an act of constructive statesmanship” and other officials, together with the New York Times, lauded it as the work of angels. The American Committee for a United Europe, established the previous year under the leadership of Senator Fulbright, was ecstatic.

By 1954, the ECSC was receiving that most cherished of all American tokens of friendship: money, in the shape of a $100 million credit approved by Congress. More would follow.

Three years later, the member countries in ECSC — France, West Germany, the Benelux states and Italy — signed the Treaty of Rome (officially, "Treaty establishing the European Economic Community") that has been tinkered with and reviewed multiple times, and remains to this day the foundational piece of paperwork over which the rotten castle of BS now called EU (itself officially named thus following the Maastricht Treaty of 1993) stays uneasily balanced.

1. Cit. “The United States and European Integration: The First Phase,” by Armin Rappaport, Diplomatic History, Vol. 5, No. 2 (Spring 1981), pp. 121-149.

2. This is not to say that Marshall Plan aid was not used for American leverage. As Nicholas Mulder, an Assistant Professor of History at Cornell University, notes in a recent essay for Foreign Affairs, the Truman administration threatened to withdraw Marshall Plan aid from the Netherlands unless the Dutch abandoned their bloody counterinsurgency war against the Indonesian nationalist movement.

3. Lewis Douglas, US ambassador to the UK, made this point publicly when, in testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on January 10, 1948, he said that the impetus for integration must be left to the Europeans and that any reference to the matter should be general and in the preamble.

4. The real name was “Treaty of Economic, Social, and Cultural Collaboration and Collective Self-Defence.”

5. April 17, 1948.

(Correction: An earlier version of this essay identified Nicholas Murray Butler, president of Columbia University, as Nicholas Murray.)